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A Reasoned Ethical Incoherence?* 
Edward W. James 
Bridgewater State College 
How should we consider moral or ethical disagreement?-as a dem- 
onstration of ethical relativism, where right and wrong, good and 
bad, are simply expressions of arbitrary differences? Or as a sign of 
bad times where people refuse to see what is right and good? Given 
the pronounced pluralism of our culture, this issue of ethical dis- 
agreement penetrates deeply. For not only does it touch such 
theoretical problems as whether our ethical positions are relative to 
persons or to culture or instead reflect some absolute in existence, 
and whether or how our principles and ideals bear on our world; but 
it also concerns the immediate and practical issue of our attitude 
toward those who disagree with us. How should Martin the pacifist 
regard Daniel the revolutionary-as a fool? Or how should Paul, 
who condemns abortion, consider Judith, who defends it-as evil? 
perverted? just different? 
To deal with these issues we need to recognize with our decade's 
resurgent idealism the necessity of system, but we also must re- 
member well the limitations of system. We need, in short, a reasoned 
ethical incoherence. Such an incoherence will be no mere common 
incoherence, flighty and impulsive, occurring by default rather than 
as the result of thinking. And it will be no mere paradox either, as 
when Mao legitimizes adopting "contradictory and strange" alliances 
with enemies of communism; for these are justified by the systems in 
which they occur-as when Mao claims that the end justifies the 
means and that these "contradictions" will further (Maoist) Marx- 
ism. No, we will need here neither unthinking nor seeming but 
reasoned incoherence: where our ethical position cannot be fully jus- 
*1 wish to thank Charlene Entwistle and Professors David Cheney and Steven 
Sanders who so insightfully and assiduously tried to cure me of my errors that only 
I can be held responsible for them. 
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tified by our ethical principles and system; where there are certain 
stances taken and claims made that cannot be deduced from or 
justified by the ethical system itself, that are disconnected from the 
remainder of the system, so that to change their status would not be 
to alter the status of the other statements in the system; and yet 
where all this represents no flight from reason but a deep apprecia- 
tion of it, both its strengths and its limits. Let us see how this is so by 
examining one form of reasoned incoherence, the doctrine of intra- 
principled ethical incoherence. 
The key to the doctrine is that the application of our ethical 
principles and ideals is similar in logic to that of our ordinary direc- 
tives and concepts. Just what these principles and ideals are and how 
we come to accept them (in professional parlance, their ontological 
and epistemological status) will not occupy us here. But what we do 
with our principles and ideals, how we apply them to the concrete 
instance, will be the door we seek to open. And the door opened will 
reveal an intraprincipled incoherence arising out of the logic of our 
ethical principles-that they are for and against certain matters, 
somewhat vague, and embrace a set of unordered subprinciples. 
Relying somewhat on past analyses and results, let us briefly see how 
we are forced to (1) choose our stance toward our principles, (2) 
make determinate the concepts and ideals within our principles, and 
(3) place in a hierarchy our subprinciples. 
1. Any general principle, by its logic of being for something, 
stands against the denials of what it is for. Hence we can act on the 
basis of a principle by stressing either what it is for or what is is 
against. If we stress what the principle is for, we work in the princi- 
ple: Our reasons justify actions as exemplary of the ideal, as does 
pacifism. But if we emphasize what the principle is against, we work 
to the principle: Our reasoning justifies actions that obliterate de- 
nials of the principle and that promote the likelihood of more 
people being able to work easily in the principle, as do certain revo- 
lutionary principles.' To ask which stance-or attitude we adopt 
toward the principle-is correct not only misses the crucial point 
that there are an indefinite number of degrees of working in and to 
principles open to us, but also overlooks that these various options 
are motivated and justified by the same general principles. For in- 
stance, Bradley and Whitehead, Moore and Pap, were motivated by 
the principle of pursuing understanding. But Bradley and 
Whitehead chose to live in the principle, developing beautiful and 
intricate systems exemplifying the ideals of coherence, elegance, 
1. Naturally this requires a good deal more argument. I am in each of these 
three cases of intraprincipled incoherence relying a good deal on past analyses. For 
a further discussion of this case, see my "Working in and Working to Principles," 
Ethics 83 (1972): 51-57. 
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completeness, and the like; while Moore and Pap chose to work to 
the principle, to chisel out crystal-hard analyses cracking to bits any 
ill-conceived claims. Or again, Gandhi and King, Marx and Ber- 
rigan, were motivated by the same general moral principle of fur- 
thering the Beloved Community. But Gandhi and King chose to work 
in the principle-to exemplify love, peace, and trust-while Marx 
and Berrigan chose to work to the principle, to destroy the denials of 
love and peace and trust and hence to promote situations-if neces- 
sary, at certain times, by means other than those which dwell within 
the ideals of the principles-where the Community is more feasible 
and natural to more people. Our principles therefore are ambigu- 
ous and support many stances. Here reason departs and forced 
choice enters. 
2. Like most concepts, moral concepts are vague, presenting no 
sharp boundaries. Rather, as Wittgenstein helped show, our con- 
cepts more or less gather together a fund of characteristics on the 
basis of resemblance or fit. Hence whether this or that characteristic 
falls under a certain concept cannot always be a matter of discovery 
but at times must be a matter of decision. For instance, to the ques- 
tion, "Is bouncing a ball a game?" there is no one reply, for general 
concepts like "game" carry no sharp boundaries. Our ethical con- 
cepts are no different. Marking boundaries between a person and a 
nonperson, killing and letting die, just and unjust punishment, for- 
giveness and indulgence, censorship and selection, civil and uncivil 
disobedience, ... cannot be a matter of discovering 'the person,' 
'true killing,' and the like. Thus searches for "principled ... solu- 
tions to line drawing problems,"2 which as the above instances 
suggest dot our moral lives, often overlook that what may be in 
question is not what the principles are but what we will determine 
them to be. Logic here opens up to us a certain range of choice. 
3. Any principle of general bearing embraces a cluster of more 
specific principles or directives. We then face the problem of order- 
ing these more specific subprinciples in a hierarchy. Which ones 
have priority? Often we are aided by one principle clearly ranking 
higher than another, as seeking completeness in mathematics usu- 
ally comes before seeking elegance: We prefer a cumbersome proof 
to no proof at all. Or, as being honest ranks over being prudent, in 
general it is better not to advance at all than to advance by cheating. 
But just as often such accommodating Cartesian clarity does not 
shine forth. Copernicus and the Ptolemaists, for instance, both fol- 
lowed the principle of advancing scientific knowledge. But Coper- 
nicus stressed the subprinciple of developing a coherent system, for 
his boasted far fewer epicycles than did the Ptolemaists'; while the 
2. Feinberg, The Problem of Abortion (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1973), p. 4. 
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latter favored the subprinciple of framing a complete system, for 
they could better account for the orbit of Mars than could Coper- 
nicus. Along the same lines, the principle of promoting justice is 
generally seen as including the subprinciples of rectifying past 
wrongs and allowing for responsible choice. The first, though, tells 
us to hire persons of minority classes that have been discriminated 
against, at least whenever the applicant is as qualified as any other 
applicant, while the second tells us that we have an obligation to hire 
the applicants of such minorities if and only if they are more qual- 
ified. Hence when a minority and nonminority person of equal qual- 
ifications compete for the same job, the subprinciple of rectifying 
past wrongs obliges the employer to hire the minority applicant and 
thus conflicts with the subprinciple of responsible choice which of- 
fers the employer a choice. As with the pursuit of knowledge, so with 
the pursuit of justice: The general principle lacks the precision to 
tell us which subprinciple holds rank. To appeal to a more specific 
criterion or to make the general criterion more specific would 
amount to a blatant circularity. For the subprinciple would then be 
chosen because of its position and not the position because of the 
principle. 
Moreover, whatever we consider the merits of these specific 
examples-there lurks the danger that I have unluckily chosen a 
special core case-the point being made bears the burden of no 
special case that may require further examination. For here we face 
the logical claim that our reasoning has built-in limits and hence 
forces us to determine more specifically the full meaning of our 
ethical position. To help further frame these ideas, let us briefly 
scrutinize some of the crucial ideas of a singular thinker, say John 
Rawls, who runs in stark contrast to the spirit of this study by striving 
to extend reason's grasp into every area of our moral lives. Rawls 
seeks "to formulate a conception of justice which, however much it 
may call upon intuition. . . tends to make our considered judgments 
converge" and thus to "introduce further coherence into our com- 
mon convictions of justice" (p. 45).3 As opposed to Rawls, this study 
urges that the ideals of total coherence and universal agreement are 
misplaced-that we must choose the stance toward our principles, 
the boundaries of our concepts, the hierarchy of our subprinciples. 
We shall find that at the heart of Rawls's position lies another 
form of incoherence, that between the ideal and the real. This in- 
coherence does not arise out of the logic of our principles-it is not 
unavoidable-but rather out of the central problem besetting any 
dualism, that of relating or bringing together two very different 
3. All page references will be to John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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realms. For Rawls founds his analysis on "ideal theory," where "strict 
compliance" with the requirements of justice is assumed as ubiqui- 
tous. Rawls does this, not for the sake of simplicity, but because he 
takes this as essential to his entire analysis. It is not merely that ideal 
theory provides us with insight into the various ills besetting our 
society now, but that it grants "the only basis for the systematic grasp 
of these more pressing problems" (p. 9). Yet Rawls then faces a 
problem. How can he proceed from conclusions in ideal theory to 
dicta aiding us in nonideal situations? To be sure, ideal theory will 
tell us that we do not live in the ideal, perhaps even that society A is 
better or nearer to the ideal than society B. But seldom is this news. 
What we want to know is what to do about it. Can the ideal help us 
here? 
For instance, Rawls criticizes the general pacifism of a Gandhi as 
"an unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine" (p. 382). 
And presumably he would extend this judgment to anyone who 
chose primarily to work in a principle. For what we need, Rawls 
suggests, is not "a general pacifism but a discriminating conscien- 
tious refusal to engage in war in certain circumstances" (p. 382). 
More specifically, if the governments of the world are "in some 
circumstances so likely to be unjust," it may be that "in the foresee- 
able future we must abjure military service altogether" (p. 381). But 
first how can Rawls justify these claims? Not by appeal to ideal or 
even to nearly ideal theory; for after all, we are speaking of war, the 
general breakdown of society and contract. Second, even assuming 
that we find some justification in ideal theory-some strange meta- 
contract concerning the breakdown of contract, as incoherent as that 
sounds-how do we move from the ideal to our world, the real one? 
For even in that strange meta-contract we enjoy full compliance, at 
least on the meta-level-a compliance we almost completely lack in 
our world. So Rawls is speaking from the standpoint of the ideal 
about a radically nonideal situation without telling us how to bridge 
the gap. And finally, a cursory glance at Rawls's remarks concerning 
pacifism will tell us how little has been said. For even a staunch 
pacifist like Gandhi could accept what Rawls suggests, adding simply 
that all earthly circumstances are so likely to be unjust that we must 
abjure military service altogether. The claims are so general as to be 
vaporous. 
Accordingly, Rawls faces three problems in his remarks about 
our world from his pinnacle of ideal theory-those of justification, 
transfer, and helpfulness. Nor is Rawls unaware of these difficulties. 
He seeks to deal with them in part through discussing "the special 
case of a nearly just society, one that is well ordered for the most part 
but in which some serious violations ofjustice nevertheless do occur" 
(p. 361; cf. pp. 382, 386). Rawls thus, like the Cartesians of old, 
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offers a bridge entity, spirits in the pineal gland, to make the gap 
between the two worlds less drastic. But as Descartes found out 
about spirits in the petite gland so we will find about the nearly just 
society, that an intermediary device seeking to span two drastically 
disparate situations must fall on one side or t'other. While Des- 
cartes's suggestion settled on the side of the body out of the in- 
fluence of will and mind, Rawls's nearly just society hovers on the 
side of the ideal, of slight concern to our world. For Rawls makes 
amply clear that the "violations" he speaks of in the nearly ideal 
society, although serious, are not that serious. In discussing civil 
disobedience, for instance, he tells us that "vindictive repression of 
legitimate dissent is unlikely" and that there "are not likely to be 
many groups similarly entitled to engage in this form of dissent" (p. 
375). By this clearly (and alas!) no major society today counts as 
nearly just-or even as almost nearly just. Hence the nearly just 
society fails to bridge the gap between the ideal and the real. 
Indeed we can now see more clearly the dilemma facing Rawls. 
If he speaks of our society he may provide some helpful direction, 
but at the price of discussing a world so far removed from the ideal 
that his claims will remain unjustified. Yet if he speaks of the ideal or 
the nearly ideal he may, on the basis of ideal theory, be able to justify 
what he says but at the cost of saying little or nothing about our 
world, the real one. Or, to return to Rawls's discussion concerning 
war and pacifism, if the ideal reflects our world, say by some strange 
meta-contract concerning the complete collapse of all contracts, it 
may apply to our lives in war, but how then can it rate as ideal 
theory? Yet if the ideal is ideal in its insistence on full compliance 
and the like, perhaps its own internal coherence will provide its main 
justification. But how then can it apply to our world? 
In seeking to deal with such difficulties, Rawls admits that in the 
"more extreme or tangled instances of nonideal theory" we will 
reach a point where "the priority of rules for nonideal cases will 
fail" (p. 303). There comes a time when ideal theory simply does not 
apply. But this only presents us with a challenge, Rawls continues, 
"to postpone the day of reckoning as long as possible and try to 
arrange society so that it never comes" (p. 303). What Rawls seeks to 
do, in other words, is substitute for the theoretical problem of tying 
the ideal to the real the practical one of so arranging society along 
the theoretical guidelines of ideal theory that we never run up 
against such extreme and tangled instances, that we have the ideal at 
least nearly operative in the real. But such a directive of course is 
inherently circular. For Rawls's problem concerns bringing to bear 
the ideal in our world. And this problem itself is a particular facet of 
the problem we face in our lives and not just in this paper, namely, 
to determine how we should apply our own ethical principles. How 
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do we untangle our situation when our principles themselves are 
ambiguous with regard to stance, vague with regard to boundaries, 
unordered with regard to subprinciples? To tell us, as Rawls does, 
that we should so arrange our lives that we do not have the problem 
of relating the ideal and the real, is to tell us next to nothing. For it 
tells us what we already know-that we need the ideal to be real- 
and remains silent about what we do not but want desperately to 
know-how to make the ideal real. 
Finally, even in the unattained but nearly just society we meet 
intraprincipled incoherence. For here Rawls maintains that "princi- 
ples that straightway decide actual cases are clearly out of the ques- 
tion" (p. 389). He thereby insists that individual decision within the 
relevant perspective of theory cannot be avoided: "each person must 
make his own decisions. ... We cannot divest ourselves of our re- 
sponsibilities and transfer the burden of blame to others" (p. 389). 
But it is just here, where Rawls's analysis ends in individual decision, 
that our discussion and so many of our major moral issues begin. 
Since even in the nearly ideal society there are serious violations of 
justice, what stance toward the principle of justice should we adopt? 
And how should we delineate our key concepts-from civil dis- 
obedience to moral person? Accordingly we find Rawls advising us 
on how to deal with vague concepts in the nearly just society, that 
they are "best discussed in the context of definite moral problems" in 
the hope that "the specific issue and the structure of the available 
general facts may suggest a fruitful way to settle them" (p. 509). 
Indeed we find Rawls moving to the specific in implicitly revealing 
an incoherence-again within nearly ideal situations at worst- 
related to the one we earlier discussed concerning subprinciples of 
justice. Rawls recognizes "the considerations singled out by the prin- 
ciple of redress ... that undeserved inequalities call for redress" (p. 
100). Yet he also holds that within a nearly just society the claims of 
"the more fortunate . . . are legitimate expectations established by 
the social institutions" (p. 103). Hence we confront the necessity of 
ranking the principles of redress and of legitimate expectation. No 
priority rules aid us here. For the various priority rules concern the 
initial distribution of fair measure-whether it be of liberty or of 
goods-and not the rectification of unfair measure. So even in the 
nearly ideal society we cannot avoid these difficult choices. 
Consequently we must search out ideas and methods to help us 
deal with the unavoidable incoherence we meet in our own very 
nonideal society. To help orient our search, let us say that we begin 
with a morality, a practice with undeniable and specific obligations 
and values ranging over all facets of our lives; that in making sense 
of this dimension we articulate an ethics, a system of principles-as, 
say, found in contractarianism-designed to organize and partially 
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justify our moral lives; and that in considering ethical reasoning in 
general, as this study attempts, we do meta-ethics which, aside from 
a general commitment to the moral, aims to be as neutral as possible 
to the various principles of ethics. Accordingly, when we are forced 
by intraprincipled incoherence to determine what our ethical prin- 
ciples or reasons are to be, we are engaged in formulating an ethics 
and thus face what may be called ethical choice. Just what experien- 
tially constitutes ethical choice-whether it is best characterized as 
voluntaristic, arbitrary, intuitive, or whatnot-will for this study re- 
main open. For here we focus on the logic, presuppositions, and 
consequences of ethical choice. 
At any rate we can complete our ethical position only by making 
choices, which we see now as embracing not only our ethical princi- 
ples but also the determinations we make by ethical choice to com- 
plete the meanings of our principles. Such choices obviously are to 
be distinguished from moral choices, where we must choose between 
an already determined right and wrong, and less obviously from 
moral dilemmas, where we face competing principles of apparently 
equal strength. While moral dilemmas speak of forced choices be- 
tween conflicting principles, ethical choices indicate areas where we 
must choose a specific meaning for these very principles. For in- 
stance, we have seen the pursuit of justice confront Rawls with the 
ethical choice of ordering the subprinciples of redress and legitimate 
expectation in order to determine just what his system of principles 
is. But in our attempt to obey the principle of redress we meet the 
dilemma concerning which group to focus our limited resources 
on-women, blacks, Chicanos? Here our principles are determined 
and it is now our task to apply them. The difference then between 
ethical choices and moral dilemmas is one between incompleteness 
in reason, where our reasons are undetermined, and incompleteness 
of reason, where our reasons underdetermine. 
Philosophy consequently helps us to be moral-not only by 
helping us to organize our moral lives through a set of ethical prin- 
ciples, but also by making clear to us that in order to complete those 
principles, with their accompanying values and obligations, we must 
make the ethical choices that are needed to determine just what they 
will be. In demanding that we complete those principles, moreover, 
we are offering no false ideal. For without our ethical choices com- 
pleting the meanings of our principles we will lack a moral position 
in certain crucial cases. Here then we meet a new ethical principle 
making clear an old moral obligation: to complete the meanings of 
our ethical principles by ethical choices. Such an obligation may be 
called one of ethical responsibility, a meta-moral responsibility in 
that it is a precondition to, and hence about, certain other moral 
obligations. For before we can have moral responsibility, the re- 
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sponsibility to choose what is right and avoid what is wrong, we must 
have a right and a wrong. But this in turn often demands, as we have 
amply seen, that we fulfill our ethical responsibility by making the 
ethical choices that complete the meaning of our principles. Such 
choices deeply trouble us: They are demanding, thrusting on us 
responsibility rather than necessity; bewildering, confronting us 
with myriad options as opposed to the one true path; and, from the 
point of view of our principles, incoherent in that it is we and not the 
principles or their systems determining what holds. But also such 
choices and the obligations to make them must be deemed reasoned 
and not irrational, for they necessarily emerge out of the limits of 
our reason. 
So what should we do? One tendency is to embrace a single 
position, so clear and bright, heroically holding off all opposing 
onslaughts. But to so view oneself, as an Achilles of thought, is- 
dare I say it?-to neglect the heel just exposed. For we do not have 
the hero's understanding, if only because we lack the clarity of the 
staged world. We live in neither the ideal nor the nearly ideal. Yet 
another tendency is to embrace a relativism, holding that all posi- 
tions are equally acceptable. But this would reject the staged world 
for no world. That our principles are incompletely determined does 
not mean that they are totally undetermined. We have at least our 
rough-and-ready principles and ideals. So again we ask, What 
should we do? Perhaps it might help here to consider briefly what we 
have done. As Locke reminded the Aristotelians that logic did not 
begin with the Master's formulations, so we must remind ourselves 
that our rationality here is practiced, that it lies implicit in our day- 
to-day decisions. It cannot be overstressed, of course, that our prac- 
tice as presented here is illustrative and not argument-the argu- 
ment will come later-and that the practice will be portrayed as a 
rational reconstruction and not history. But by briefly scrutinizing 
some of our actions we will be seeking both to lock ourselves into the 
practical and to expose an implicit rationality. In so doing we shall 
find an emphasis on concrete cases as well as an attempt to heed the 
conflicting demands of both variety and order. 
First, then, our moral perspective in reasoned incoherence is in 
part one of considering competing examples: If instances are to be 
treated as similar, at least the differences have been urged.4 So re- 
garding abortion, for instance, we heed the nature of the conceptus 
at its various stages from conception to birth; we compare and con- 
4. Again I rely on past analyses to develop this point. For the thinker who is 
influencing me here-and whom indeed I am paraphrasing in this paragraph-see 
Edward H. Levi's too-neglected work An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948), esp. pp. 1-10, 17-18, 21-22, 30-31, 58-60, 
103-4. 
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trast abortion to self-defense and euthanasia; we scrutinize any dif- 
ferences between legally permitting and state funding of an abor- 
tion; and so on. Here we can rely on no overriding theory, for we are 
determining in part what the theory is by deciding what instances fit 
under what principles. No specific situation or overarching claim 
announces that this similarity or difference, this item, is decisive. Yet 
we do not stand bereft of considerations. For we, the present moral 
agents, seek to see the moral sphere as a whole, attempt to embrace 
and make determinate all the relevant principles and considerations. 
Such an attempt, then, hardly means the end of argument. But what 
we need is a greater realization of the focus of the argument-that 
we remain rooted in the particular and in our own central role as 
characterized by ethical choice. 
Moreover, we seek to balance the conflicting demands of both 
variety and order. In the first place, we tolerate a diversity not only 
among ourselves but also within our own personalities. Recall for 
example, how many own handguns and yet would vote against such 
legal ownership; or how HEW demands preferential hiring of 
minorities yet often consigns these demands to the care of benign 
neglect; or how the celebrated Dr. Edelin was convicted of man- 
slaughter, which is punishable by up to twenty years in prison, and 
yet received a mere one-year suspended sentence, thereby greatly 
relieving the jury that convicted him! At first glance we can make 
only nonsense of such tensions: a pacifist gun owner, a hypocritical 
institution, foolish jurists, a judge flouting justice by an absurd le- 
niency.5 But to so view such representative tensions is to forget that 
they essentially mark us as moral beings, beings in part defined by 
the profound freedom of ethical choice. Some choose to work to the 
principle of pacifism and stand willing to shoot murderers, as Quak- 
ers have supported capital punishment, but just as legitimately 
choose to work in pacifism by voting to abolish the legal handgun, as 
Quakers have refused to war. Some, like HEW, choose to order the 
criteria of justice by ranking the rectification of past wrongs over 
allowing for responsible choice, yet recognize implicitly, in a some- 
times relaxed vigil, that this ordering is not the only ordering. And 
the jury convicting Edelin ethically chose to consider as a person the 
aborted fetus-hence the verdict of guilty-yet recognized that Ede- 
lin ethically chose not to so view the fetus-hence their relief. In 
these rational reconstructions, in sum, we find an attempt to allow 
for ethical choice, both within ourselves and within others. But in 
the second place we also see in these instances that an equal in- 
sistence on restraint, again both personal and public, complements 
5. See, for instance, Seth Mydans, "When Is an Abortion Not an Abortion?" 
Atlantic (May 1975), pp. 71-73. 
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this willingness to accept diversity. Not anyone can carry a gun or be 
declared a conscientious objector. In its sometime neglect, HEW 
reveals a restraint toward those who order the subprinciples of jus- 
tice differently, yet in its frequent enforcement of its guidelines 
places corresponding demands on those who disagree. The judge in 
his lenient sentence reflects the view of restraint toward Edelin that 
the jury, in spite of its severe sentence, so much wanted.6 
Accordingly we seek to respect ethical choice both by permitting 
the diversity it brings and also by restraining this diversity through 
compromise. And for good reasons. We tolerate diversity not only 
because by and large we cannot condemn it but also because we are 
indeed morally obligated to appreciate it. Yet we must restrain this 
diversity out of respect for morality, the moral community, and the 
moral person. 
For how can we condemn those who make different ethical 
choices than "we" do? Not on the basis of inconsistency. For these 
rational reconstructions portray no one as abandoning standards: 
the handgun owner acts on the basis of pacifism-in the one instance 
on what will best work to it and in the other on what best exemplifies 
or works in it; HEW acts out of justice, respecting both compensa- 
tory justice and personal responsibility; the jury, the judge, and 
Edelin all act out of respect for persons; and so on. Nor, though, can 
we condemn on the basis of immorality. For the ethical principles 
are followed assiduously, not one is denied. We cannot favor a "side" 
as reflecting the one true way-say that we should work to pacifism 
or declare the conceptus a person or hold that responsible choice 
ranks over rectifying past wrongs-without being blatantly circular. 
Accordingly, tensions and not contradictions, personal and social 
struggles and not hypocrisy or backsliding, mark these instances. 
Moreover we should seek not to condemn here, as we are so 
wont to do, but to appreciate. For we are dealing with persons com- 
6. Two other instances may help here. Gandhi the vegetarian found he could 
not work completely in that principle, that to his great disquiet he had to drink milk. 
For vegetarianism, like any ethical principle, forces us to choose a stance toward it, 
so that a Gandhi may choose to curtail his complete indwelling in that principle in 
order to promote the ideals embedded in it in other ways. Or Justice Holmes, 
discussing how ignorance concerns guilt, distinguished between ignorance of fact 
and ignorance of consequences, where ignorance of fact is based on "the actual 
condition of the defendant's consciousness" and so for Holmes is to be treated more 
leniently than is failure to foresee a consequence, which is "determined by the 
standard of the prudent man" and thus does not tolerate gross ignorance. But a 
concept like guilt lacks absolute distinctions, so that a Holmes might indeed have 
legitimately reversed his policy and based ignorance of fact on prudence; yet more 
often than not, when we come down hard in one area, as Holmes does regarding 
ignorance of consequences, we curb our blow in another, as he does in ignorance of 
fact (Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law [Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881], 
p. 56). 
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mitted just as deeply as we are to the moral perspective. Yet this 
perspective tells us in part to act on the basis of certain principles- 
e.g., utilitarian, perfectionist, contractarian-which themselves re- 
quire completion. Hence to be moral is not just to follow principles 
but also to determine their full meanings. Only in this way, as we 
have already remarked, can we have a complete set of values and 
obligations. Consequently to reject the differences which result from 
these legitimate ethical choices as demonic, or depraved, or dumb, is 
to deny a crucial component in our moral lives. It is to deny that our 
principles require personal determination and thereby is to under- 
mine the very morality to which we are so committed. 
Furthermore, even though we must acknowledge and ap- 
preciate at times very different ethical positions from our own, 
namely, those positions resulting from different ethical choices, this 
does not deny the force of our own position. For one fundamental 
result of ethical choice is the insight that we do not live on one moral 
level, where we view our ethical position as the only legitimate one, 
but that we must also accept and live within a meta-ethical level-one 
that addresses and seeks to make intelligible the multifarious variety 
of ethical positions. On this meta-ethical level we discover that ethi- 
cal positions different from our own are not necessarily evil, per- 
verted, or stupid. And on this level we learn to appreciate the partial 
openness of principles and the consequent choice-making power of 
all moral agents. Such an appreciation calls for respect for, and 
restraint in the face of, the various choices of others, who are, after 
all, fulfilling their moral being by filling out their ethical positions in 
making these choices. But since this appreciation occurs at the 
meta-ethical level, it does not call for any servile acceptance of the 
decisions of others. For appreciation is a multiedged sword cutting 
not just for others but also for ourselves. Hence we too will demand 
that all other moral agents appreciate our position as well. 
Thus only to some extent should ethical choice be allowed. 
Based as it is on a commitment to morality and to the principles 
which express morality, ethical choice demands respect for 
persons-an ideal embedded in various ways in our moral princi- 
ples. But such respect requires that the moral purview of each per- 
son be given a weight, that all persons can rightfully believe that 
their decisions and ethical choices count. For being respected means 
being taken seriously, and this in general translates into being effec- 
tive. Yet one crucial way we experience ourselves as effective is to see 
our ethical position figure in societal policy. This of course does not 
mean that our position is necessarily followed, but it does mean that 
it exercises a force in the final policy. Nor does this mean that each 
person has political force, thereby committing us to a liberal view of 
society and thus tainting the neutrality of this study. For the force we 
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speak of here is moral, where one's moral being must be seen as 
counting in the community-a face that is as central to a Marx as it is 
to a Locke. 
And again, to see the need for restraint from one other vantage 
point, we are not dealing here with one person but with many, 
bound together in a moral community. Yet such a community 
grounds our morality-teaching it, reinforcing it, providing it with 
many, some say all, of its ingredients. Hence we should take care 
that the diversity we tolerate in the name of morality does not de- 
stroy one cornerstone of that morality, the moral community. Ac- 
cordingly, while offend one another we will-ethical choice guaran- 
tees that much-our commitment to morality, the moral commu- 
nity, and the moral person demands that we seek to mitigate these 
mutual offendings by a sympathetic restraint. 
We have in effect a new ethical principle making clear another 
old moral obligation: to develop a society which allows for the 
greatest possible ethical choice and at the same time promotes the 
deepest sense of moral concern. This itself is not justified by any 
specific ethics but carries a meta-ethical justification. It follows from 
respect for the ethical principles themselves-calling for the comple- 
tion of our morality, the preservation of our moral community, the 
assurance of all moral agents that their ethical choices count. Since it 
concerns the logical preconditions of any ethical principle-the 
kinds of choices that are required to complete the meaning of any 
ethical principle-it thereby has priority over any individual princi- 
ple. As stated, of course, it too demands completion, from determin- 
ing one's stance toward it to delineating and ordering its ideals and 
subprinciples. But as stated, it asks for a broad search for that variety 
coupled with restraint that best reflects respect for morality, moral 
persons, and the moral community. 
What such a society will be is yet to be determined, is in the 
making now. Theoretical generalizations, as we have amply seen, 
will not work. But outlawing or permitting all abortions, condemn- 
ing all benign neglect as racist, or proposing such neglect as an 
across-the-board policy-such postures will not serve. For they deny 
the force of ethical choice. To be sure, such claims as these are 
unhelpful if we seek tidy principles "to draw the lines." But we have 
argued here that there are no such principles, that it is a matter of 
logic that our principles are somewhat undetermined. Whatever our 
principles may be, whether there is one true principle or many 
equally acceptable ones, does not bear on this conclusion-that the 
principles, whatever they may turn out to be, must be completed by 
ethical choices. Hence we must adopt a new attitude toward these 
issues and the deep differences which characterize them. And it is 
just here that ethical choice enters by specifying and justifying a new 
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mode of dealing with disagreement-one of acceptance and appre- 
ciation. Instead of seeking to draw the line by the one true ruler, 
which leads us into a vicious labeling of those who disagree with us as 
perverted or whatnot, we shall seek to understand and compromise. 
Consequently restraint and compromise appear not just as a practi- 
cal policy, to appease others and get along, but also as a moral policy, 
to respect the logical presuppositions of all ethical principles and 
thus to respect morality itself. 
In conclusion, to demand uniformity in the name of consistency 
is to deny morality in the name of morality. All-or-nothing ap- 
proaches that seek the ethical position for society hurt rather than 
help. For in our pluralistic society especially we need desperately to 
distinguish fundamental or moral disagreement, a Solzhenitsyn 
against a Stalin, from subtle or ethical disagreement, a King against 
a Berrigan. We have moral disagreement when we meet the denials 
of our principles and the ideals embedded in them, as Stalin's inter- 
rogators denied everything dear to morality. But we have ethical 
disagreement when we meet differences resulting from the various 
options offered to us by our ethical principles. The former marks 
our stands as moral beings, the latter our legitimate ethical choices. 
Both sorts of disagreement will be with us always, but one is unyield- 
ing, offering no compromise, condemning a Munich as a sellout; 
while the other must yield, must compromise, on pain of morality 
tearing itself apart. 
